Cognitive Representation in Transitive Inference: A Comparison of Four Corvid Species by Bond, Alan B. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Alan Bond Publications Papers in the Biological Sciences 
2010 
Cognitive Representation in Transitive Inference: A Comparison of 
Four Corvid Species 
Alan B. Bond 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, abond1@unl.edu 
Cynthia A. Wei 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, cwei3@unl.edu 
Alan C. Kamil 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, akamil1@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/bioscibond 
 Part of the Behavior and Ethology Commons 
Bond, Alan B.; Wei, Cynthia A.; and Kamil, Alan C., "Cognitive Representation in Transitive Inference: A 
Comparison of Four Corvid Species" (2010). Alan Bond Publications. 6. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/bioscibond/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Papers in the Biological Sciences at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Alan Bond Publications by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
1. Introduction
Representations are cognitive constructs in which features of 
the external world are abstracted and mirrored in the nervous 
system as “functioning isomorphisms” (Spence, 1950; Gallistel, 
1990). Operations performed on representations allow extrapola-
tion of implicit properties of real-world systems (Zentall, 2001), 
so under appropriate conditions, one can infer the “use” of par-
ticular representations through controlled behavioral tests. The 
theoretically simplest form of representation would be generated 
by a pure conditioning process, in which the perceptual world 
was considered as an aggregate of distinct elemental events. 
Representations of each event would be linked only to other 
events that were “intrinsically associated,” through being simi-
lar in appearance, similar in physiological consequences, or suffi-
ciently invariant in sequential occurrence. In the original sense of 
the British empiricists, these “associative” relationships are thus 
restricted to correlations that would enable a hypothetical ratio-
nal observer to make an inference of causality (Boring, 1929). 
“Configural” or “relational” representations, in contrast, are 
those that combine the representations of at least two elemental 
events that are not otherwise intrinsically associated (Sutherland 
and Rudy, 1989). So relational representations consist of linkages 
between events or stimuli that are connected in a non-causal or 
non-contingent fashion, such as by occurring in particular points 
in geometric space or by being connected in a social or concep-
tual network, or by being otherwise unrelated components that 
occurred simultaneously at some specific time in the past. Rela-
tional representations thus encode both the primary attributes of 
environmental components and the relationships among them 
(Halford et al., 1998; Godfrey-Smith, 2002). In structurally com-
plex environments with many interlinked components, animals 
could use relational representations to infer novel, unanticipated 
connections between stimuli and to update encoded informa-
tion rapidly and accurately (Tomasello and Call, 1997). The clas-
sic example is a “cognitive map,” which postulates a flexible men-
tal representation of spatial relations that would allow an animal 
to find novel routes between familiar locations (Tolman, 1948; 
O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978), but similar considerations should also 
apply to the representation of complex social environments. 
Animals that live in large, persisting social groups must 
maintain a dynamic categorization of group members on several 
dimensions, including genetic relationship, reproductive status, 
and dominance ranking (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Seyfarth 
and Cheney, 2001), requiring a relational representation of the 
social world that is at least as complex as that demanded by any 
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physical environment (Tomasello and Call, 1997). In fact, social 
networks have often been compared to cognitive maps, with the 
social distance between individuals serving as an analog of the 
physical distance between spatial locations (Boguñá et al., 2004; 
Liben-Nowell et al., 2005). And as in spatial cognitive maps, ex-
perimental subjects can navigate conceptually through a social 
network by following linkages between adjacent individuals 
(Watts et al., 2002; Kumaran and Maguire, 2005). This implies 
that even complex social networks can be transitive, where the 
fact that A dominates B, and B dominates C, allows the infer-
ence that A probably dominates C. An ability to make such “so-
cial inferences” has been demonstrated in several animal species 
(Paz-y-Miño et al., 2004; Grosenick et al., 2007), but much of the 
existing research on non-spatial relational representation has fo-
cused on operant transitive inference. 
1.1. Transitive inference
In this paradigm, animals are trained to respond differen-
tially in trials of overlapping “premise” pairs from an implicit 
hierarchical list (such as A > B > C > D > E) of arbitrary stimuli, 
where only responses to the higher ranked item in each pair are 
rewarded. So if the subject is shown B and C, for example, the 
correct response is to choose B; if it is shown C and D, the cor-
rect response is C. Subjects are subsequently tested with trials 
of novel, more distant stimulus pairs to analyze their ability to 
make transitive judgments. The primary theoretical focus of the 
literature has been on models based on “associative strength,” 
which view an organism’s choice between test stimuli to be the 
result of the difference in their relative reinforcement history, 
with the ordered series of values constituting the outcome of the 
training procedure (Lazareva and Wasserman, 2006). 
The closest approximation to a purely “associative” inter-
pretation of transitive inference (in the sense we have outlined 
above) was proposed by Couvillon and Bitterman (1992). The 
primary assumption of the Bitterman model is that pigeons treat 
the stimuli in a premise pair independently, making their choice 
solely on the basis of the associative strength values assigned 
to each stimulus. In this model, any process that can produce a 
monotonic ordering of associative values is sufficient to enable 
transitive inference (Wynne et al., 1992). Because there is no as-
surance that an associative process will produce a truly linear 
array of strengths, however, choice performance must be a func-
tion of the relative associative strength of the two stimuli in a 
pair, that is, on Vi/(Vi + Vj). The only other aspect of the Bitter-
man model that is essential is that rewarded responses to a par-
ticular stimulus must result in relative increases in associative 
strength and unrewarded responses to relative decreases. Asso-
ciative strength thus must depend, not just on the number of re-
warded responses, but on the proportion of responses that have 
been rewarded during the recent past. 
This mechanism will produce an “associative representa-
tion,” conceptually equivalent to a vector of associative strength. 
Couvillon and Bitterman (1992) contended that the strength vec-
tor would be sufficiently monotonic to enable correct respond-
ing to transitive test pairs. Their rationale was luminously sim-
ple. Responses to A are always rewarded. It will, therefore, have 
high strength, so most of the responses to A/B will be given to 
A. Responses to B will be rewarded when it is presented in B/C, 
but the few responses to B in A/B will be unrewarded and will 
ensure that B’s strength will always be lower than that of A. Be-
cause of B’s reduced strength, there will be more erroneous, un-
rewarded responses to C in B/C than there are to B in A/B. C’s 
strength will, therefore, be lower than B’s, even though it is re-
warded in C/D trials. Continuing down the hierarchy, by this 
reasoning, should yield progressively diminishing differential 
rates of reinforcement, generating a monotonically decreasing 
gradient of associative strength (Wynne et al., 1992). Transitive 
choices in this representation would then simply be a matter 
of choosing the alternative with higher associative strength. To 
choose between C and E, for example, the animal would refer to 
the strength levels associated with each stimulus and distribute 
the probability of its response accordingly. 
A relational representation, in contrast, must be derived from 
configural memory of the relationship between both the chosen 
and the unchosen stimulus. There is no comparably clear ratio-
nale for a universal mechanism for relational encoding, but the 
process has most commonly been expressed in spatial terms, as 
an analog to a cognitive map (Huttenlocher, 1968; Roberts and 
Phelps, 1994; Weaver et al., 1997; Lazareva and Wasserman, 
2006). Jacobs (2006) has offered a theoretical perspective that 
can be restated in somewhat simpler terms. When the subject is 
shown a premise pair, it appears to metaphorically place repre-
sentations of the two items on a cognitive map in proximity, in-
dicating that they are related by coincident occurrence. If any 
two items are never seen together, their representations will be 
shifted progressively further apart. As experience with the prem-
ise pairs accumulates, the hierarchical map gradually develops 
into a linked list, in which the representation of each item con-
verges on a location between the items above and below it in the 
hierarchy. Based on this structure and knowledge of the identity 
of the highest valued stimulus, it is possible to infer the relative 
rankings of any pair by chaining down from the top of the hier-
archy through a succession of spatially adjacent representations 
(D’Amato, 1991; Terrace, 2005). Most models of relational repre-
sentation have made use of neural networks (e.g. Delius and Sie-
mann, 1998; Wu and Levy, 2001), though it is by no means clear 
that simple back-propagation fully captures the complexity of re-
lational learning (De Lillo et al., 2001; Jacobs, 2006). 
Evidence of relational representation in operant studies has 
come from serial list learning in monkeys, including the “wild 
card” procedure of D’Amato and Columbo (1988) and D’Amato 
(1991) and Terrace’s (1993, 2005) simultaneous chaining tech-
nique. But one of the most compelling demonstrations of non-
spatial relational representation in animals is Treichler and 
Van Tilburg’s method of transitive inference across linked lists 
(Treichler and Van Tilburg, 1996; reviewed in Treichler, 2007). 
They trained macaques on overlapping premise pairs in two 
separate, implicit 5-item lists (e.g. A > B > C > D > E and 1 > 2 
> 3 > 4 > 5). Once the lists were learned, they gave the monkeys 
extensive training on a linking pair that would conceptually 
place one list above the other in a larger implicit hierarchy (e.g. 
training on 5 >A would place the second list above the first). 
They then tested novel transitive combinations both within and 
across the two lists. The monkeys responded with high accuracy 
to combinations that spanned the two lists, higher even than 
they displayed on premise pairs within lists. This striking out-
come, supported by an extensive analysis of error patterns, is 
very difficult to explain in terms of pure associative encoding, 
but it is consistent with a relational representation. 
The Couvillon and Bitterman (1992) model proved to be 
woefully inadequate as a description of the behavior of real an-
imals. If the only outcome of a trial is to increase the relative as-
sociative strength of correctly chosen stimuli (and decrease that 
of erroneously selected ones), choice accuracy will oscillate 
down the hierarchy in a highly non-monotonic fashion, and the 
model will only predict performance on transitive test probes 
under very limited circumstances (Siemann et al., 1996; Delius 
and Siemann, 1998). Bitterman’s model did, however, spark a 
vigorous program in experimentation and descriptive modeling 
(reviewed in Wynne, 1998; Lazareva and Wasserman, 2006; Vas-
concelos, 2008). The most successful descriptive models have 
employed variants of Value Transfer Theory (von Fersen et al., 
1991), the assumption that by occurring in the same display as 
a rewarded choice stimulus, a non-rewarded, non-chosen stim-
ulus would also gain associative strength. So in a B/C choice, if 
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B were correctly selected, its associative strength would be in-
cremented, as also would that of C (though to a lesser degree). 
The strength of C is, thus, dragged up in rewarded B/C trials 
by this additional, inferential process, stabilizing the oscillatory 
pattern of pure associative strength. Zentall and his students 
have found experimental evidence consistent with the existence 
of this mechanism, which they interpreted to be a form of sec-
ond-order classical conditioning (Zentall and Sherburne, 1998; 
Steirn et al., 1995; Zentall et al., 1996). This suggests that value 
transfer may serve as a mechanism for configural encoding in 
these experiments. It is by no means the only potential mecha-
nism, however. A number of studies have concluded that addi-
tional sources of configural information must also be involved 
(Weaver et al., 1997; Delius and Siemann, 1998; Lazareva and 
Wasserman, 2006; Vasconcelos, 2008). 
In general, stimulus relationships in sequential learning de-
signs are probably multiply encoded (Moyer and Bayer, 1976; 
D’Amato and Colombo, 1990; Lazareva and Wasserman, 2006), 
and most species would be expected to make some use of both 
associative and relational representations in operant transitive 
inference (Jacobs, 2006). Although either mechanism can poten-
tially enable transitive responding on particular pairs of stim-
uli, however, they are probably far from equivalent in real-
world settings. Because each item links precisely to the next one 
in the sequence, relational representations should be more ac-
curate than those based only on associative strength (D’Amato, 
1991; Terrace, 2005), and they are likely to be much more flexi-
ble (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978; Treichler, 2007). But relational in-
ferences are probably slower than associative ones, since they 
require chaining down from the top of the hierarchy (Terrace, 
2005), and they appear to be unavoidably neurologically com-
plex. From an evolutionary perspective, these considerations 
suggest that only species with natural histories that demand 
precise configural memory should make extensive use of re-
lational representation. And this implies that a species com-
parison grounded in differences in natural history may reveal 
consistent, predictable differences in the mode of cognitive pro-
cessing (Kamil, 1988; Riley and Langley, 1993). 
Given that there is no generally accepted account of config-
ural encoding, the most robust means of evaluating the level of 
use of configural or relational information is to compare the per-
formance of each subject to the clear, albeit approximate, stan-
dard of the Couvillon and Bitterman (1992) conditioning model. 
We used a minimal version of this model to predict the pattern 
of relative accuracy as a function of position in the hierarchy, 
as it would be displayed by some hypothetical organism that 
completely lacked configural memory. The virtue of this pared-
down model is that it makes unequivocal predictions about the 
pattern of correct choices in operant transitive inference based 
exclusively on the past sequence of events and on conditioning 
processes that have been universally recognized and accepted 
for well over a century. Each stimulus is valued on the basis of 
its own reward probability, irrespective of the context provided 
by the comparison stimulus. It is a conceptually “pure” associa-
tive model that can readily serve as a predictive null model for 
comparing and contrasting the use of relational representations 
in different species. In this study, we employed this null model 
to quantify the relative degree of reliance on relational represen-
tations during a symbolic transitive inference task, and to com-
pare the use of relational memory across a series of related cor-
vid species that differ in their natural history. 
1.2. Natural history of corvids
Corvids present an attractive opportunity for evolutionary 
comparative research on cognition. The natural history of the 
family is diverse and well known. Not only are most corvids 
amenable to operant testing, allowing standardized measures of 
cognition (Olson et al., 1995; Balda et al., 1997; Bond et al., 2007), 
they are also large-brained and perform very well across a wide 
range of cognitive tasks (Emery and Clayton, 2004). Pinyon jays 
(Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) are among the most social corvids in 
North America, the peak of what Brown (1987) termed the “co-
lonial” route to sociality in jays. They forage and breed in per-
manent flocks of 50–100 adults and as many as 200 juveniles 
and yearlings (Balda, 2002). The flocks are not simple aggrega-
tions, but groupings of familial clans, in which foraging, court-
ship, mating, and parental care are all performed synchronously 
(Marzluff and Balda, 1992; Balda, 2002). Western scrub jays (Aph-
elocoma californica), in contrast, show very limited sociality, being 
found in at most temporary groupings of a mated pair and their 
young of the year (Curry et al., 2002; Carmen, 2004). In our initial 
study of transitive inference among corvids (Bond et al., 2003), 
we compared the performance of these two species. The results 
suggested that relational encoding played a much larger role in 
the responses of pinyon jays while scrub jays appeared to make 
relatively more use of associative representations. These results 
were consistent with the hypothesis that relational representa-
tion of non-spatial hierarchies is better developed in species that 
experience greater social complexity (Bond et al., 2003). 
The natural histories of even closely related species sel-
dom vary along only a single dimension, however. Pinyon jays 
and scrub jays differ strongly in their use of spatial memory as 
well as in sociality. Each summer, pinyon jays bury thousands 
of pine seeds in unmarked locations across their home ranges, 
forming food caches that are retrieved and consumed through-
out the subsequent winter and spring. They make extensive use 
of other food resources, as well, but cached seeds are very im-
portant for successful reproduction (Marzluff and Balda, 1992). 
Recovery of food caches is heavily dependent on spatial mem-
ory (Vander Wall and Balda, 1981; Balda and Kamil, 1998). 
Scrub jays cache a variety of food items, but generally only for 
shorter periods, and they rely far less on subsequent retrieval of 
caches than pinyon jays (Vander Wall and Balda, 1981; de Kort 
and Clayton, 2006). Reflecting this ecological distinction, pinyon 
jays have consistently out-performed scrub jays on a number of 
spatial memory tasks (Balda and Kamil, 1989; Kamil et al., 1994; 
Balda et al., 1997). It is entirely possible, therefore, that the dif-
ferential use of relational representation in these species is a re-
flection of their adaptation to differing degrees of spatial, rather 
than social, complexity. 
We have explored this possibility by extending our original 
work to two additional corvids, Clark’s nutcrackers (Nucifraga 
columbiana) and azure-winged magpies (Cyanopica cyanus). Nut-
crackers are almost exclusively dependent on cached pine seeds 
during the winter and display more precise and persistent spa-
tial memory than any other corvid species tested (Balda and Ka-
mil, 1989, 1992; Kamil et al., 1994). They are, however, resolutely 
and aggressively solitary, perhaps even more so than scrub jays 
(Tomback, 1998). Azure-winged magpies, in contrast, have a 
“group territorial” breeding system (Brown, 1987), in which 
up to 20 related birds defend a common, multipurpose terri-
tory (Hosono, 1989; Komeda et al., 1987) and assist one or two 
breeding pairs in raising their young (de la Cruz et al., 2003). 
Like scrub jays, however, azure-winged magpies have a broad 
dietary niche and do not appear to rely heavily on spatial mem-
ory, caching only some highly valued food items for short pe-
riods (Turcek and Kelso, 1968; Canário et al., 2002). Data from 
these two species, combined with the results of Bond et al. 
(2003), would therefore provide information on transitive infer-
ence performance from four corvid species with a broad array of 
social and spatial adaptations. 
Although these species are behaviorally distinctive, they are 
closely related, all members of the same family. Aphelocoma and 
Gymnorhinus are among the most closely related of the six cor-
vid genera endemic to the New World (Espinosa de los Monte-
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ros and Cracraft, 1997). Nucifraga and Cyanopica are Old World 
genera from an earlier corvid radiation, but they still assort with 
the North American jays into neighboring clusters in the phy-
logeny of the family (Ericson et al., 2005). To the degree that 
there are differences in cognitive capabilities among these spe-
cies, a strong case can be made for interpreting these differences 
as adaptations to the varying sources of environmental com-
plexity that they experience, rather than as the result of taxo-
nomic disparity (Balda et al., 1996; Healy, 2006). 
As the preceding text makes clear, our intent in the current 
experiment was to collect data to be analyzed together with the 
data from Bond et al. (2003).We therefore used apparatus and 
procedures that were as similar as possible to those of the ear-
lier study. There were, however, some differences in methods 
as a result of the interval between the studies. These will be de-
scribed at the end of Section 2. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Subjects 
Six azure-winged magpies and six Clark’s nutcrackers were 
captured in the field for use in this study. The magpies were 
obtained from a banded population near Badajoz, Spain, that 
has been studied for a number of years by Carlos de la Cruz; 
the nutcrackers were taken with live traps in central Colorado. 
Birds were housed in individual cages in environmentally con-
trolled rooms (22°C; 14 h:10 h light:dark). Captive nutcrackers 
were fed turkey starter, sunflower seeds, parrot pellets, meal-
worms, and pine nuts; magpies were fed soft-billed avian diet 
and mealworms. Both were given supplementary vitamins. 
During experiments, the birds were maintained at 85–90% of 
their free-feeding weights, with unlimited access to grit and wa-
ter. They were all initially naïve to operant procedures; but the 
nutcrackers had previously been used in open room tests of spa-
tial memory. 
2.2. Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on 15-in. ViewSonic LCD monitors 
embedded in the front panel of a 48 cm × 48 cm × 48 cm operant 
chamber. The monitor was framed with an EloTouch Systems 
infrared touch screen, and a thin sheet of Lexan polycarbonate 
was placed between the touch screen and the monitor to serve 
as a resilient pecking surface. A perch was mounted parallel to 
the front panel of the chamber, re-positioned for each species so 
that the center of the LCD was approximately at eye level. Re-
wards of the most preferred food items for each species—pieces 
of pine nut for nutcrackers and fruit-flavored food pellets for 
magpies—were delivered by a motorized “lazy-susan” feeder 
into a food well centered below the touch screen and signaled 
with a food light. The chambers were diffusely lit, and ambient 
white noise was provided to mask external sounds. Stimulus 
presentation, event timing, reward delivery, and data recording 
were controlled by Pentium computers, using a library of cus-
tom-coded C routines. 
The circular stimuli were 35 mm in diameter and were uni-
formly colored in red, green, blue, magenta, yellow, cyan, or-
ange, or white, as defined by the standard VGA palette. Each 
non-white stimulus was overlaid with a specific alphanumeric 
character in black at the center. The characters, which had pre-
viously been shown to be maximally discriminable for pigeons 
(Blough, 1985), were X, O, C, E, A, W, and U (Arial font, roughly 
13 mm high). White stimuli, which were used for training and 
for start signals, had a 9-mm black disk overlaid in the center. 
Stimuli could be displayed at any of three positions, spaced at 
6.8 cm intervals across the center of the display. 
2.3. Training phase 
Birds were first habituated to the operant chamber and au-
toshaped to peck a central white stimulus. They were then 
trained to peck the white stimulus in either of the lateral posi-
tions. An initial white stimulus in the central position was then 
added as a start signal, and the birds were conditioned to peck 
it as a means of initiating the next trial. Finally, the response re-
quirement for the lateral positions was increased to three pecks. 
When the birds achieved 32 or more correct responses for three 
consecutive days, they were advanced directly to discrimina-
tive training on the full implicit hierarchy, using random trial 
sequences of the six adjacent premise pairs. 
At the beginning of each discrimination trial, the start signal 
was displayed in the center of the display. If it was not pecked 
within 15 s, the signal was turned off, and the trial was reiniti-
ated after a 3-s delay. When the start signal was pecked, it was 
turned off, and a pair of non-white stimuli was displayed in the 
lateral screen positions. Upon three successive pecks to one of 
the stimuli (an FR 3), the display was darkened. If the response 
was correct, a light was illuminated in the food well and a re-
ward was delivered. After 10 s, the food light was turned off, 
and another trial was initiated 20 s later. Incorrect responses 
produced a 30-s delay before the next trial, but no correction 
procedure was employed. If the bird failed to peck either stimu-
lus three times within 60 s, the panel was darkened, and the trial 
was repeated after a 30-s delay. To control for possible effects 
of differences in discriminability, the seven colored stimuli were 
ordered in six distinctive hierarchies. Across the orderings, no 
stimulus occurred more than twice in the same ordinal position, 
and no adjacent pairing occurred more than once. Each unique 
ordering was assigned at random to one individual of each spe-
cies. Premise pair training was conducted in daily sessions of 36 
trials, consisting of equal numbers of all six color pairs in ran-
domized order and counterbalanced with respect to the position 
of the correct stimulus on the display. Training was continued 
until each subject was judged to have reached an asymptotic 
level of performance. 
2.4. Simulation methods 
We simulated the acquisition of an associative representa-
tion with a probabilistic model of the accumulation of associative 
strength, a simplified version of a pure conditioning account of 
the acquisition of premise pairs (Luce, 1959; Couvillon and Bitter-
man, 1992). An implicit linear hierarchy of seven stimuli, S[0] to 
S[6], was assessed in choices between successive premise pairs, 
in which the stimulus with the lower index value was always 
correct. Two seven-element vectors, R and U, tracked the num-
ber of rewarded and unrewarded responses, respectively, to each 
stimulus within a memory window of the previous W trials. For 
each iteration of the model, these vectors were initialized to zero, 
and the program was run through a series of 100 sessions of 36 
choice trials, including equal numbers of all six premise pairs in 
random order. To select between a pair of stimulus alternatives, 
S[i] and S[i + 1], corresponding strength values were computed 
as the proportion of the previous responses to each stimulus that 
were rewarded (i.e. V[i] =R[i]/(R[i] +U[i])). The probability of 
choosing S[i] (the correct, higher ranked stimulus) was then es-
timated as P =V[i]/(V[i] +V[i + 1]), and the choice for the given 
trial was decided by comparing P to the next (0, 1) pseudo-ran-
dom number. At the end of each trial, the R and U vectors were 
shifted down one step (thereby moving W forward in time) and 
updated with the trial results. R and U were carried over from 
one session to the next, enabling the program to converge over 
sessions on a stable distribution of response probabilities. 
We used the simplest version of the Couvillon and Bitter-
man (1992) model: λ (the associative strength increment from a 
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single trial) was assumed to be 1 for correct choices and 0 for 
incorrect ones, and β (the scaling factor) was 1 for both correct 
and incorrect choices. As a result, the only free parameter was 
the size of the memory window. An extensive initial explora-
tion was conducted to determine the effects of differences in W. 
When W was shorter than a single session, the choice accuracies 
did not converge on a stable configuration even when hundreds 
of sessions were run sequentially. However, the results were 
completely consistent and reliable for any value of W that ex-
ceeded the number of trials in two sessions. We decided to use a 
memory window fixed at 100 trials for our predictive simulation 
runs, which meant that the final model had no free parameters 
whose values were arrived at by fitting to the data being ana-
lyzed. It was, in effect, an algorithmic re-expression of the pri-
mary assumption of a pure associative representation, namely 
that choice probability was exclusively determined by the rela-
tive proportions of rewarded responses. 
To assess the characteristic configuration of accuracies result-
ing from this hypothesis, we programmed the model in Pascal, 
with pseudo-random numbers provided by a subtract-with-bor-
row lagged Fibonacci generator with an extraordinarily long pe-
riod (Marsaglia and Zaman, 1991). The data resulted from 300 
iterations of independent runs of 100 successive 36-trial ses-
sions. From the last five sessions of each of the 300 iterations, 
we calculated and saved the mean probability of responding to 
each stimulus, the mean proportion of rewarded responses to 
each stimulus, and the mean accuracy on the six premise pairs. 
Means of these values across all iterations formed the theoretical 
basis for comparison to the birds’ performance. 
2.5. Test phase 
Following their attainment of asymptotic performance levels, 
the birds began transitive inference testing. Test sessions con-
sisted of three probe trials of non-adjacent stimulus pairs imbed-
ded among 33 premise pair trials identical to those used during 
previous training sessions. In each test session, three of the six 
types of probe trials were integrated with the premise pair se-
quence in random order, spaced from one another at variable 
intervals of between 10 and 14 trials. A complete set of all six 
probes was given across each two consecutive sessions. Because 
responses to the highest and lowest stimuli in the implicit rank-
ing were either always or never reinforced, probe tests included 
all possible novel stimulus pairs that did not involve the first 
and last items (pairs B/D, B/E, B/F, C/E, C/F, and D/F). Each 
bird received 40 test sessions for a total of 120 probe trials, with 
each probe type being presented 20 times. To prevent the birds 
from learning the test pairs directly, all choices during probe tri-
als were rewarded. 
2.6. Procedural differences 
The first procedural difference between the current study 
and Bond et al. (2003) experiment was that the earlier study 
used a VGA monitor mounted behind a panel with three peck-
ing keys. The stimuli were the same VGA colors as in the cur-
rent study, but with slightly smaller circles. We increased the 
size of the circles and overlaid the alphanumeric characters to 
offset the tendency of touch screens to produce higher frequen-
cies of off-target pecking than mechanical keys. Both modifica-
tions served to improve pecking accuracy. 
We also changed the training procedures. In the Bond et al. 
(2003) study, as well as in many earlier transitive inference ex-
periments (reviewed in Vasconcelos, 2008), training on the 
premise pairs was conducted in mixtures of gradually increas-
ing complexity, building up to the full design in which all prem-
ise pairs were presented in random order within single sessions. 
Birds were trained first on sessions of a single color pair (A/B, 
then B/C, then on C/D). When a bird reached a criterion of 32 
or more correct responses in each of three successive sessions, it 
was advanced to the next pair. As each bird completed the last 
pair (F/G), it was advanced to a second training phase, an equal 
mixture of trials on two adjacent color pairs (e.g. B/C and C/D). 
When each bird reached the same training criterion on these tri-
adic sessions, it was switched to a fully intermixed design, in 
which it was required to track all six color pairs presented in 
equal numbers and randomized order in each daily session. 
Over time, with increased experience with these types of 
experiments with corvids, we have improved on this training 
procedure. With the original method, the transition from ses-
sions on one premise pair to sessions on the next pair in the se-
quence constituted a partial reversal, in which a previously in-
correct and heavily trained choice was now rewarded. This 
insured that accuracy at the beginning of every block of new 
pair trials would be less than 50%. At least a few birds of both 
species in the Bond et al. (2003) experiment stopped respond-
ing at these transitions and had to be given one or two ses-
sions of non-discriminative re-training on white stimuli to in-
duce them to resume pecking. Treichler and Van Tilburg (1996) 
encountered similar difficulties with a stepwise introduction 
of premise pairs in their research with rhesus macaques. They 
subsequently discovered that operant training that included all 
premise pairs together from the beginning produced learning 
that was initially somewhat slower, but that ultimately enabled 
asymptotic performance in far fewer sessions than any graded 
introduction. They found that this training did not influence 
choice performance during the testing phase (Treichler and Van 
Tilburg, 2002). All corvid research involving transitive designs 
that we have conducted since 2003, including that on the nut-
crackers and magpies in the current study, has used such fully 
intermixed training from the outset. We have found that perfor-
mance following intermixed training is fully comparable to that 
produced by the “sequential” procedure in our 2003 paper. The 
birds reach comparable levels of accuracy, and perform simi-
larly on premise and probe test pairs. 
3. Results 
All of our analyses used data from both the current experi-
ment and the Bond et al. (2003) study. The possible effects of the 
procedural differences between the experiments on these analy-
ses are discussed below. 
3.1. Species differences in premise pair acquisition 
During both studies, we trained all birds to an asymptotic 
level of accuracy on the full set of premise pairs to obtain con-
sistent performance during the test phase. For most subjects, a 
criterion of three successive four-session blocks at ≥ 80% correct 
on all trials was sufficient. However, one nutcracker, two mag-
pies, and all of the scrub jays initially failed to attain this level 
of accuracy. In these cases, we transferred the birds to the test 
phase when their overall performance was stable and consis-
tent across at least three successive four-session blocks. For nut-
crackers and magpies, completion of the training phase required 
means of 81 and 77 sessions, respectively (about 3000 trials). Pin-
yon jays needed an average of only 56 sessions (about 2000 tri-
als) on the full set of premise pairs, though they had previously 
been given an average of 66 graded training sessions on smaller 
sets of stimuli. Scrub jays needed an average of 146 training ses-
sions (nearly 5300 trials) on the full task, despite having previ-
ously received an additional 133 sessions of graded training. As 
Treichler and Van Tilburg (2002) found in macaques, gradual 
introduction of premise pairs does not necessarily improve se-
quence learning in all species.  
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To test for species differences in rates of acquisition, we de-
termined a standardized pair of accuracy criteria. The first four-
session block during which the bird attained ≥ 60% correct on all 
premise pairs was chosen as the beginning of a learning assess-
ment interval. The end of the interval was a function of the bird’s 
asymptotic maximum accuracy. We estimated the asymptotic 
maximum from the bird’s performance on the six premise pairs 
during the last five blocks of the test phase (i.e. the last 20 ses-
sions of the experiment). The lower 95% confidence limit for this 
presumed maximum was then compared to the upper 95% lim-
its from a running series of five blocks throughout both phases of 
the experiment. The first block during which accuracy was sta-
tistically indistinguishable from the final asymptotic level was 
taken as the end of the assessment interval. Species differences 
in both the asymptotic maximum and the duration of the assess-
ment interval were tested with analysis of variance. There was a 
significant effect of species on asymptotic performance, F(3, 17) = 
5.72, p < 0.007, due to the consistently lower accuracy of the scrub 
jays, F(1, 17) ≥ 6.03, p < 0.03. Nutcrackers, pinyon jays, and mag-
pies were all performing at 80% correct or better either by the 
end of training, or within at most the first two blocks of the test 
phase. In contrast, only one of the four scrub jays had reached 
this criterial accuracy even by the end of the experiment. The du-
ration of the assessment interval, however, showed no signifi-
cant effect of species, F(3, 17) < 0.58, p > 0.6. The mean number of 
acquisition blocks to asymptote was 15 for magpies, 19 for nut-
crackers, 17 for pinyon jays, and 21 for scrub jays, and there was 
a great deal of variation between individuals. 
3.2. Development of a relational index 
The results of the simulation runs on the associative model 
are summarized in Table 1. At first glance, premise pair accu-
racy appears to fluctuate erratically with distance from the top 
of the hierarchy. A more careful examination of Table 1, how-
ever, reveals that the observed accuracy contour is actually a re-
liable projection of the complex associative process that takes 
place in an implicit linear array. Responses to G, for example, 
are never rewarded, so one might expect that pair F/G would be 
discriminated with perfect accuracy. The model does very well 
on F/G, but it never approaches 100% accuracy. This is because 
on half the trials in which F occurs, it is presented along with E, 
and responses to F are incorrect in E/F. So the average propor-
tion of rewarded responses to F is about 43%. Because the prob-
ability of choosing a particular stimulus is based on the ratio of 
its associative strength to the sum of the strengths of both stimuli 
in the display, the probability of choosing F in F/G must, there-
fore, be less than 1.00. F does derive a significant amount of as-
sociative strength from the F/G trials, however, to the degree 
that it consistently attains about twice the strength of E. So the 
model incorrectly chooses F about 75% of the time in E/F, mak-
ing the accuracy for this premise pair lower than for any of the 
others. In turn, because E is seldom chosen in E/F trials, and be-
cause choices of E in D/E are incorrect, the associative strength 
of E is depressed, which enhances the relative accuracy of D/E 
choices, and so on up the hierarchy. In essence, the fact that A 
is always rewarded and G is never rewarded sets up a stand-
ing oscillatory wave in the strengths of the intervening items, 
which is clearly seen in the mean probability of responding to 
each stimulus (Table 1).  
Given the unexpected shape of the predicted function, it is 
remarkable how closely the mean accuracies for all species on 
each premise pair from the test phase sessions resembled the 
contour of simulated accuracies (Figure 1). The scrub jay con-
tour, in particular, followed every fluctuation predicted by the 
associative model, but the nutcrackers and magpies showed a 
similarly depressed accuracy on E/F, and all species were more 
accurate on the terminal pairs than on any of the more central 
ones. Because the jays all appeared to show some varying de-
gree of correspondence to the model results, we computed a “re-
lational index” for each subject, based on its performance on 
premise pairs during the test phase. If the mean accuracy on 
premise pair i of a given bird is B[i], and the predicted accuracy 
of our model of associative representation is M[i], then the rela-
tional index, RI, is calculated as: 
RI =
 ∑i(B[i] − M[i]) 
                                                   ∑i(1 − M[i]) 
This ratio approaches 1.0 when the bird’s performance shows 
uniformly high accuracy on all pairs, which would be consis-
tent with a purely relational representation (e.g. Terrace, 1993, 
2005). It decreases toward 0.0 as the bird’s performance ap-
proaches that of the associative model. The index thus provides 
a relatively objective estimate of the extent to which the associa-
tive model predicts performance across the premise pairs. Thus 
 
 
Table 1.  Simulation results by stimulus. 
Stim  Prb Rsp  Prp Rwd  P Pair  PP Acc  T Pair  TP Acc
A  0.9516  1.0000
   A/B  84.0%  B/D  68.4%
B  0.6491  0.7680
   B/C  56.6%  B/E  78.7%
C  0.3580  0.2657
   C/D  37.2%  B/F  64.2%
D  0.6013  0.3549
   D/E  58.1%  C/E  56.2%
E  0.3601  0.2075
   E/F  25.4%  C/F  38.3%
F  0.7584  0.4277
   F/G  77.6%  D/F  45.4%
G  0.2001  0.0000 
Simulation consisted of 300 iterations of a 100-session series, with 36 
trials per session and a memory window of 100 trials. Columns: Stim 
= stimulus identifier; Prb Rsp = probability of response to given stim-
ulus (irrespective of context); Prp Rwd= proportion of responses to 
given stimulus that were rewarded; P Pair = premise pair; PP Acc = 
percent correct responses to given premise pair; T Pair = transitive 
probe pair; TP Acc = percent correct responses to transitive probes. 
Variables are means over the last five sessions of all 300 iterations. 
Figure 1. Mean accuracy by species of responses to premise pairs dur-
ing the test phase, compared to the results of simulation of associative 
representation. PJ = pinyon jays; NC= Clark’s nutcrackers; AM= azure-
winged magpies; SJ = western scrub jays; Sim = simulation results. 
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if there are two basic processes in use, it also provides a measure 
of the extent to which relational representations are used. Our 
next step was to analyze the discrepancies between the Couvil-
lon and Bitterman (1992) model and the behavior of the four cor-
vids to explore the possible relationship between performance 
in operant transitive inference and natural history.  
3.3. The influence of natural history
The four corvid species in these studies differ in their natu-
ral histories along two orthogonal dimensions—social complex-
ity and cache reliance. To characterize the species with respect 
to these dimensions, we employed numeric ranking. Pinyon 
jays live in persistent groups of hundreds of individuals, so we 
gave them a sociality rank of 3. Magpies live in groups of re-
lated birds that are at least an order of magnitude smaller than 
those of pinyon jays, so they were assigned a sociality rank of 2. 



















































received a sociality rank of 1. In the spatial dimension, nutcrack-
ers are wholly dependent on cached pine seeds for survival, so 
we gave them a rank of 3 for cache reliance. Pinyon jays also 
make use of cached food, but their niche is broader than that of 
nutcrackers and they are less dependent on caching, so we gave 
them a caching rank of 2. Magpies seldom cache, and scrub jays 
cache much less often than nutcrackers and pinyon jays, so they 
both were given a caching rank of 1. 
To test the effects of the natural history of these species on 
their cognitive representations, we regressed the relational in-
dex from each bird against our rankings of sociality and cache 
reliance. The regression model was significant, F(2, 18) = 7.03, 
p < 0.006, accounting for 44% of the variance across subjects in 
the relational index. The squared semi-partial correlation for 
cache reliance accounted for 30% of the variance, t(1, 18) = 3.1, p 
< 0.007, while that for social complexity accounted for 23%, t(1, 
18) = 2.69, p < 0.015. Both of our life history variables thus had 
significant, independent effects on the relational index. Spe-
cies that make greater use of cached food, as well as those that 
live in larger, persistent social groupings, showed greater rela-
tive deviations from our simulation of associative representa-
tion (Figure 2). 
3.4. Transitive inference testing 
Probe trials from the six transitive test pairs were aggre-
gated within subjects according to “symbolic distance” (Moyer 
and Bayer, 1976), the degree of separation between stimuli along 
the implicit hierarchy. (Thus, the symbolic distance = 2 for B/D, 
C/E, and D/F; 3 for B/E and C/F; 4 for B/F.) Repeated mea-
sures anova showed a significant main effect of species on ac-
curacy, F(3,18) = 4.76, p < 0.01 (Figure 3). As was the case in the 
acquisition of premise pairs, scrub jays were less accurate on 
transitive tests than any of the other three species, F(1, 18) ≥ 4.77, 
p < 0.05. There was also a significant main effect of symbolic dis-
tance, F(2, 34) = 15.0, p < 0.0001, but there was no significant spe-
cies × distance interaction, F(6, 34) = 1.14, p > 0.3. Although the 
scrub jays performed less accurately than the other three spe-
cies, all four species showed similar patterns of transitive infer-
ence across different test pairs. 
If the cognitive demands of an animal’s environment had 
selected for an increased reliance on relational representa-
tion, we might conceivably see differences in task acquisition 
as a function of the relational index. This did not prove to be 
the case. Regression of the duration of the assessment interval 
on the relational index was not significant, F(1, 19) = 1.19, r2 < 
0.06, p > 0.2, indicating that birds that showed higher reliance 
on relational representations did not necessarily learn the task 
faster. We also tested for the possibility that a high relational 
index was associated with more accurate performance on tran-
sitive test pairs. Mean transitive test accuracy was uniformly 
higher than the model predictions across all species (Figure 3) 
and in all but one of the subjects, t(5) ≥ 2.73, p ≤ 0.03, by as 
much as 30–40 percentage points. The sole exception was scrub 
jay #803, which performed almost precisely as predicted by the 
associative model, t(5) = 0.14, p > 0.8. This bird also exhibited 
the lowest asymptotic accuracy level and the lowest relational 
index of any subject in the study. If a bird made inferences en-
tirely on the basis of an associative representation, our model 
predicted that at a symbolic distance of 2 steps, accuracy on 
B/D should be higher than that on D/F, and at a distance of 
3 steps, accuracy on B/E should be much higher than that on 
C/F (Table 1 and Figure 3). We tested these hypothetical rela-
tionships for differences between species and effects of the re-
lational index. Neither anova showed a significant main effect 
of species, F(3, 17) ≤ 1.32, p > 0.3, and regression of the differ-
ences against the relational index was similarly uninformative, 
F(1, 19) ≤ 1.59, r2 ≤ 0.08, p > 0.2.  
Figure 2. (a) Residuals from regressing the relational index on the spe-
cies ranking for cache reliance, as a function of the ranking of social-
ity. Results are plotted by subject, with an adjustment to prevent over-
lapping symbols. In the multivariate regression, sociality accounted 
for 23% of the variance in the relational index. (b) Residuals from re-
gressing the relational index on the ranking of species sociality, as a 
function of the ranking of cache reliance. Results are plotted by sub-
ject, again with some adjustment in the abscissa to prevent over-
lapping symbols. PJ = pinyon jays; NC= Clark’s nutcrackers; AM= 
azure-winged magpies; SJ = western scrub jays. In the multivariate re-
gression, cache reliance accounted for 30% of the variance in the rela-
tional index. 
Figure 3. Mean accuracy by species of responses to selected prem-
ise pairs and transitive probes during the test phase, in order of their 
symbolic distance. These are visually compared to the results of sim-
ulation of associative representation. PJ = pinyon jays; NC= Clark’s 
nutcrackers; AM= azure-winged magpies; SJ =western scrub jays; Sim 
= simulation results. Both the main effect of species and that of sym-
bolic distance were statistically significant, but there was no signifi-
cant interaction. 
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4. Discussion
Operant transitive inference in an implicit hierarchy is a de-
ceptively simple paradigm. In our simulation of pure associa-
tive representation, the probability of responding to a partic-
ular stimulus was determined only by its relative associative 
strength, that is, the relative frequency of rewarded responses to 
each stimulus. In contrast to predictions in the early condition-
ing accounts of transitive inference (Couvillon and Bitterman, 
1992), the model did not produce a monotonic decrease in asso-
ciative strength as a function of distance from the top of the hier-
archy. Instead, the response probability tended to oscillate reg-
ularly along the hierarchy, driven by the disparity between the 
invariably positive reward for responses to the top-most stimu-
lus and the invariably negative outcome of responses to the bot-
tom one (Table 1). 
Without the benefits of a monotonic strength function, a 
purely associative representation cannot account for transitive 
responding. Results from shorter, five-item sequences may ap-
pear to be open to an associative interpretation (Allen, 2006), but 
when the design is extended to larger numbers of stimuli, as in 
our experiments, or to non-linear sequences or more complex 
reward relationships, it is extremely difficult to explain transi-
tive responding without including some configural or relational 
component (Weaver et al., 1997; Delius and Siemann, 1998; De 
Lillo et al., 2001). Virtually all of our birds responded more accu-
rately on transitive probes than would have been expected from 
a purely associative representation. The difference from expec-
tation was generally largest for probes of C/F, where the model 
predicted 38% correct responses (Figure 3). The average accu-
racy for this pair across all subjects and all species was 89%, con-
sistent with the high accuracies that have been reported for sym-
bolically distant transitive probes in many other studies (e.g. 
von Fersen et al., 1991; Treichler, 2007). Most animals probably 
develop both associative and relational representations of pairs 
of stimuli, perhaps acquiring them simultaneously as two differ-
ent aspects of a single encoding process (Jacobs, 2006; Lazareva 
and Wasserman, 2006). 
If animals do develop both types of representation then the 
appropriate focus, when making species comparisons, is not on 
whether an animal’s performance can be explained exclusively 
in terms of associative representations. Instead, it is more use-
ful to explore the use each species makes of the two types of 
representation and the consequences for task performance. In 
this regard, the strongest finding from this study was that as-
pects of the characteristic natural history of these four corvids 
had direct, predictable influences on their apparent degree of re-
liance on relational representation. Both dependence on cached 
food and living in large, persistent social groupings proved to 
be significantly and independently associated with our index 
of relational representation, a measure that was derived from 
the birds’ average asymptotic performance on adjacent, prem-
ise pairs (Figure 2). Such similar outcomes from such apparently 
distinctive selective factors may reflect a common requirement 
for accuracy and flexibility in configural memory among species 
that deal with structurally complex environments. 
Our analysis of these four species combined data from two 
separate experiments with somewhat different procedures, par-
ticularly during premise pair training. In our previous study, 
the pinyon jays and scrub jays were trained on mixtures of trial 
types that gradually increased complexity, building up to the full 
design in which all premise pairs were presented in random or-
der within single sessions. There is no apparent correlation, how-
ever, between which procedures were used and performance at 
asymptote on the premise pairs or during testing on the non-ad-
jacent test pairs. In particular, the species that showed the great-
est (scrub jays) and least (pinyon jays) agreement with the sim-
ulation model were both tested in the first study. The possible 
effects of the training methodology appear, therefore, to have 
been conservative relative to the conclusions of the study. 
Given that the primary focus in operant studies has generally 
been on the animals’ responses to the novel, non-adjacent stimu-
lus pairs, it is striking that the clearest evidence of species differ-
ences in cognitive representation was found in their pattern of ac-
curacy on premise pairs. Effects of relational representation were 
not displayed in probes of novel associations, but in the pairs of 
adjacent stimuli on which the birds had previously been trained 
for thousands of trials. One consistent interpretation is that tran-
sitive inference in these relatively short sequences of arbitrary 
stimuli is not particularly cognitively demanding (Allen, 2006). In 
this view, nearly any encoding of relational information, no mat-
ter how rough and approximate, will suffice to enable accurate 
responding on distant transitive probes, but only a fairly precise 
designation of stimulus positions on a relational map would al-
low for consistently high accuracies on adjacent pairs. 
The species contrasts we observed could, therefore, reflect 
several types of differences in information processing. For ex-
ample, birds with lower relational indices may simply not at-
tend to configural features, at least in this experimental design. 
Scrub jays did not attain the same levels of accuracy at asymp-
tote as the other three species, and they showed the clearest re-
semblance to the accuracy contour of our associative model (Fig-
ure 1). However, the rate of task acquisition showed no effects 
either of species or of relational index. The lower asymptotic ac-
curacy of the scrub jays did not, therefore, appear to reflect in-
sufficient experience: indeed, they received 100 more acquisition 
sessions than did the pinyon jays in Bond et al. (2003) with no 
significant improvement in accuracy. If the relative frequency of 
reward is the single most salient feature of the implicit hierar-
chy design for scrub jays, their predominant focus on associa-
tive outcomes would have imposed a fixed ceiling on their max-
imum performance levels. 
The comparative data on spatial memory in seed-caching 
corvids are consistent with the idea that species differences in 
cognition are often most apparent when more challenging tasks 
are employed. Olson (1989, 1991) compared nutcrackers and 
scrub jays in an operant delayed spatial nonmatching-to-sample 
task. The two species performed at similar levels during train-
ing with a minimal delay between sample and choice. When the 
task was made more difficult, however, either by increasing the 
number of samples to be remembered or by increasing the delay 
between sample and choice, nutcrackers performed much better 
than scrub jays. 
It is sometimes suggested that the effects of natural selection 
on cognition result in modularized cognition, abilities that are 
confined to the context in which the selection has occurred. The 
data on spatial memory and cache dependence clearly indicate 
that this need not be the case. There are many experiments that 
have found a correlation between cache dependency and perfor-
mance during noncaching tests of spatial memory among cor-
vids, in operant tests (Olson, 1991; Olson et al., 1995) and radial 
maze analogs (Kamil et al., 1994). Similar results have been ob-
tained in other taxa (e.g., parids: Brodbeck, 1994; Brodbeck and 
Shettleworth, 1995, Clayton and Krebs, 1994; kangaroo rats: Bar-
kley and Jacobs, 2007). The results of our comparative studies of 
operant transitive inference suggest that behavior in this labora-
tory test of cognition may also be related to the natural histories 
of the species being tested. 
At the neurobiological level, the extent of relational repre-
sentation may be limited by species differences in the encod-
ing mechanism (Riley et al., 1981). Scrub jays may attend equally 
well to the configural information in the displays, but they may 
not be able to encode it accurately as a consequence of species-
specific differences in neuroanatomy. There is a growing litera-
ture implicating the hippocampus as a flexible relational engine 
intrinsic to all configural learning, one that is capable of produc-
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ing map-like representations of many different types of event 
association  (Wallenstein et al., 1998; Driscoll et al., 2005; Za-
lesak and Heckers, 2009). In this case, both spatial and non-spa-
tial relational representations may derive from a common neu-
ral mechanism, and the similar selective influences of social and 
spatial complexity may be the result of similar effects on the size 
and structural complexity of the hippocampus. Comparative 
research on corvid neuroanatomy has mainly been concerned 
with the relationship between the size of the hippocampal for-
mation and reliance on cached food (e.g. Brodin and Lundborg, 
2003; Lucas et al., 2004). Our results suggest that a narrow fo-
cus on comparative spatial memory may be unwarranted, how-
ever, as both social and spatial complexity can potentially have 
equivalent selective effects on hippocampal function. Additional 
neurobiological studies of corvids, comparing the detailed func-
tional anatomy of the hippocampus in species with a suitably 
broad range of natural history features, could be of significant 
value. 
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